This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of 6
1

Introduction 22
Competitive bidding is the regular procurement method for many goods and services. 23
Moreover, the requirement to ensure transparency, publicity and equality of opportunity in 24 public procurement, means that clear procedures have to be followed by bidders ( The traditional means of doing this is by the lowest bid auction, which assumes that the 28 lowest (most competitive) bid is the best for the owner and therefore wins the auction 29 (1) 212 Therefore, in capped auctions, bids can be equally analyzed as monetary bids ( i b ranging 213 from 0 to A) or as drops ( i d ranging from 0 to 1 or, equally, from 0% to 100%). In uncapped 214 auctions -auctions in which the engineer does not set a maximum or a minimum price and in 215 which bidders can freely submit the bids they want -the bids can only be expressed as 216 monetary bids ( i b ), since there is no set limit from which calculate the drop. 217 10 It is quite usual that some countries use the capped bidding approach while others resort 218 to the uncapped approach. However there is a large number of countries that adopt both 219 approaches depending on their respective traditions, preferences or specific needs 220 (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2010). In this case, capped bidding is used more frequently whenever 221 there is a previous and well-developed project that clearly defines the scope of the works to 222 be carried out. On the other hand, when the request for proposals invites the bidders to submit 223 a bid for the design, build and sometimes the operation of the works auctioned, it is often 224 more convenient to resort to uncapped bidding since the scope of work is less defined. score is calculated (TSF); (c) the way the weights the bid and the technical scores are set; and 239 (d) how the ALBC is defined. Since this paper only focuses the on the bid score, (b) is ruled 240 out, and the three main variables become the BSF, bid score weighting and ALBC. 
Scoring Parameter Relationships 258
The bid scoring rules comprise, in addition to the weighting factor, two mathematical 259 expressions: (1) the Bid Scoring Formula (BSF), which are expressions similar to the ones 260 shown in Table 1 where bo and do are the estimated cost of the auction expressed in money or drops, 279 respectively. Analogously, an auction X evidences a higher level of bid dispersion when 280 these three ratios: bmin/bm, bmax/bm and s/bm (or equivalently in drops dmax/dm, dmin/dm and σ/dm) 281 are larger in auction X compared to auction Y. 282
The problem is that these SP ratios do not follow a linear relationship, because the SP 283 variation itself is not generally linear either; thus, its relative variations must be carefully 284 measured and compared. This is the aim of the present section, describing the major features 285 of the SP and how they are interconnected with each other, so their relative variations can be 286 properly registered and used later for linking them to more aggressive/conservative bidding 287 behavior and to a higher concentration/dispersion of bids. 288
Therefore, as noted above, in both uncapped and capped auctions, the Scoring Parameters 289 have particular mathematical relationships with each other; however, from now on, only SP 290 13 relationships expressed in drops will be considered. These relationships are described and 291 justified in Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2012b, 2013a, 2015a ) and, when they are expressed as a 292 function of the scoring parameter mean drop (dm), they are as described in the first column of 293 Figure 1 . As can be seen, each of these expressions is known when the respective 'regression 294 coefficients' (, ,  and , respectively by rows) is determined. 295
<Figure 1> 296
Specifically, these four regression coefficients have the following meanings: 297   relates the estimated cost (do) to the mean bid (dm) when expressed in drops. The larger 298 this coefficient is, the larger the mean drop will be compared to the estimated cost 299 (aggressive bidding); whereas the smaller is , the mean drop will also be smaller (more 300 conservative bidding). 301   relates the mean bid (dm) to the maximum drop (dmax). The larger this coefficient is in a 302 particular auction, the closer is dmax to dm , meaning more conservative bidding. We 303 therefore use '   ' instead of '   ', because '   ' will be read the same way as  is read 304 (the larger   denoting more aggressive bidding). This coefficient also indirectly means 305 the concentration/dispersion of bids, since the distance between the lowest and the 306 average value of bids indicates how dispersed the bids are. 307   is a very similar coefficient to '   ', sharing the same mathematical expression, but 308 relating the highest bid (lowest or minimum drop dmin) to dm. The larger  is, the further 309 dmin will be located from dm and vice versa. Table 1 (the complete auction data having not been displayed for the 319 sake of brevity), which share the same BSF description (coded as ID in Table 1 ). The 320 'regression coefficient averages', however, are presented in the last four columns of Table 3 , 321 while a numerical example is also given in Table 2 . 322
The third and last column in Figure 1 displays how each regression coefficient average 323 potential value is associated with different levels of bidding aggressiveness and/or dispersion. 324
In particular, each graph represents how different intervals of the regression coefficient 325 values produce different curves. These indicate how the relative distances or ratios between 326 do, dmax, dmin or σ, respectively, to dm, evolve. Table 2 shows a numerical example detailing 327 how the four average regression coefficients are calculated according to the second column of 328 Figure 1 for a particular BSF (BSF ID=1 from Table 1 ) with two auctions (n=2). 329
<Table 2> 330
All the variables used in Table 2 have The central block in Table 3 Finally, the BSF gradient is concerned with the bidders' perception of how quickly they 359 score reduces as a function of how far apart they are from the best-scored bid (theoretically 360 from the first ranked bidder, see last column of Figure 2 ). This is easily visualized by plotting 361 the Si curve for an auction. However, the interest is really in the shape of the curve: (1) a 362 concave curve indicating the bid score reduction is larger near the best bid; (2) a convex 363 16 curve indicating the bid score reduction is smaller near the best bid; and (3) a linear curve 364 indicating the bid score reduction is constant no matter what the distance to the best bid. 365
<Figure 2> 366
The expectation now is that, with a higher bid score weighting ( k w ), bidders will bid 367 lower (with bigger drops) in order to win the auction as they have less possibility of gaining 368 any advantage through having a superior technical proposal. Similarly, when the ALBC 369 width is wide (larger values of k t ) and excludes very few bidders, bidder behavior is expected 370 to be more aggressive since there is less chance of being disqualified for bidding too low. 371
Analogously, concerning the BSF gradient, bidders whose di values are close to the 372 maximum drop dmax, are more likely to compete strongly whenever they feel that their score 373 will be reduced even though their bids are quite similar; this only happens with concave BSF 374 gradients. This increased bidding aggressiveness for auctions with a specific combination of 375 Table 2 for each different set of n auctions with the same ID from Unfortunately, non-linear analyses usually require far more data when the contribution of 415 each independent variable is still to be researched, and the present dataset is not extensive 416 enough to allow such an extensive analysis. However, the adopted three-level system equally 417 allows two important aspects to be analyzed: the degree of contribution of each independent 418 variable ( 
Results
423
The results of the four regression analyses performed -one for each dependent variable, that 424 whereas the second promotes bidding conservativeness. Nevertheless, the relatively small 451 correlation factors suggests that, even though there is some combined effect of the three 452 independent variables, they are expected to be minor, i.e., every variable depicts a relatively 453 independent single component that affects bidding behavior. 454
Conversely, it is worth highlighting that the regression analysis found the linearity 455 assumption to be reasonably satisfied. However, as noted above, this was not necessarily 456 
<Figure 5> 477
The major results from the ANOVA also indicated that both the bid score weighting and 478 ALBC width are almost always more important than the BSF gradient (their Fisher LSD 479 intervals rarely intersect), whereas the bid score weighting was not always more influential 480 than the ALBC width (since their Fisher's LSD intervals are partially overlapped for most Y 481 variables). Therefore, the results of this latter analysis confirm that the variables bid score 482 weighting, ALBC width and BSF gradient are already ranked in decreasing order of 483 importance, but the first two almost always have a quite similar influence on bidder behavior. 484 21 Summarizing, as said in the "Hypotheses", the expectation was that the higher the bid 485 scoring weighting (X1= k w ), the lower the bidders would bid, as they would have had less 486 possibility of gaining any advantage through having a superior technical proposal. Similarly, 487 when the ALBC is lenient (because it excludes very few bidders by a very large or even non-488 existent X2= k t value), bidder behavior was expected to be more aggressive since there is less 489 chance of being disqualified for bidding too low. Analogously, it was claimed that bidders 490 who are close to the lowest (maximum drop) would be more likely to compete strongly with 491 concave BSF curves as they would feel that their score might be reduced even though their 492 bids are quite similar. 493
Hence, for example, it can be seen that BSF ID=6 from Table 4 . 511
<Table 4> 512
As can be seen, per-unit deviations between actual and estimated values generally remain 513 below 10%. However, there are two exceptions for  (the regression parameter that specifies 514 the linear relationship between do and dm) with deviations up to 20%. It must be noted 515 however, that years 2009 and 2010 were the first officially considered in the economic 516 recession in Spain; hence, it is expected that with equivalent cost estimates (do) the bidders 517 bid more aggressively (lower mean bids, dm) compared to the previous period of 2003-2008. 518 However, these deviations were found only for the dependent variable Y1 (  ) , not for the 519 other three (   ,  and  ). Therefore, overall, it can be considered as a highly satisfactory 520 result. 521
522
Discussion and Conclusions 523
There are many scoring formulas currently in use for evaluating bid proposals in Best 524
Value auctions. These affect bidder conservativeness-aggressiveness in profound ways but 525 their design in practice is invariably a highly intuitive process, involving few theoretical or 526 empirical considerations. To date, the vast literature of theoretical competitive models has 527 relied almost exclusively on a combination of the foundational axioms of economics and 528 intuition together with scarce experimental results that many perceive as being of uncertain 529 veracity. The contribution here adds to the relatively tiny amount of complementary field 530 studies in this area, providing some confidence in the theoretical developments so far. 531
In this paper, an analysis aimed at bridging this gap through the empirical study of a 532 sample of 131 Spanish procurement auctions is provided in order to establish the changes in 533 bidding competitiveness that occur, at least partially, in response to the mathematical scoring 534 23 rule chosen by the engineer in the auction specifications. In doing this, three major variables 535 are hypothesized as being likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both 536 their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of their bids. These 537 variables are the bid score weighting (how relatively important is the bid in contrast with the 538 technical proposal), the ALBC measured by its width (how narrow is the cut-off that sets a 539 threshold beyond which a bid is disqualified), and the BSF measured by its gradient (the 540 concavity, linearity or convexity of the scoring curve that makes bidders realize how quickly 541 their score decreases the more they exceed the lowest bid). For example, aggressive bidding 542 is expected to occur with a high bid score weighting (hardly any non-price features allowed), 543 no abnormal bid detection and a concave scoring curve. From this, it is easy to show that the 544 traditional lowest-wins auction prompts the most aggressive behavior from bidders and, 545 hence, all the negative outcomes associated with aggressive bidding. 546
In terms of industry practice, the findings concern both the bidders and the entities that 547 design and/or eventually award the auctions. On one hand, bidders can benefit from 548 understanding how different BSF and ALBC mathematical configurations force them to 549 submit more competitive price bids, that is, to renounce to higher profits for the sake of 550 obtaining higher scores. Indeed, bidders who understand these effects even before their first 551 bidding experience might gain a clear competitive edge over their rivals. 552
On the other hand, the findings of the research indicate the potential for individual 553 engineers or owners to control the aggressiveness of bidders' bids to a level that strikes a 554 desired balance between the monetary costs of under-competitiveness and the increased risk 555 of problems associated with over-competitiveness. Previous research into optimal auction 556 design is far from incorporating such practical issues as non-price features, unrealistic bid 557 detection and actual individual auctioneer risk preferences. The conceptual framework 558 developed in this paper, therefore, offers a potential means of doing this through the design of 559 24 enhanced scoring formulas for individual engineers. In its present form, however, the analysis 560 is restricted to providing a general qualitative configuration. The next logical step is the 561 development of a quantitative means of determining how small variations in the BSF 562 mathematical expressions might affect the level of bidder aggressiveness and bid dispersion 563 for a future Best Value auction. This could be done, for example, by unbalancing the 564 importance of the bid versus the technical proposal, adjusting the ALBC width or just by 565 implementing BSF curves with different levels of concavity/convexity. All this is with the 566 intention of promoting an equilibrium between competitiveness and risk among bidders' bids, 567 since in public construction contract auctions, for instance, both practitioners and researchers 568 are aware that overly conservative bidding tends to waste public funds (i.e., a situation in 569 which bidders make unreasonably high profits when winning the auction), whereas overly 570 aggressive bidding causes problems such as poor quality, prolonged construction duration 571 and 'false economy', that are said to ruin the health of the entire industry in the long run 572 Figure 3 
